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State of Utah 
A. H. HODGES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
EV ANDER L. \V AITE, also known as 
E. L. WAITE, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 8018 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a Judgment on the verdict in 
the Plaintiff's favor, rendered in a suit for damages brought 
by A. N. Hodges, vs. Evander L. Waite, also known as 
E. L. Waite. 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was negligent in an 
automobile collision and the Defendant's defense was that 
the Plaintiff's negligence was the approximate cause of the 
collision and in Defendant's Cross-Complaint claimed that 
the Plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the collision 
and prayed for damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts in this case are as follows: De-
fendant had been hunting on the 20th day of October, 
19.51, up Temple Fork, in Logan Canyon. Temple Fork 
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being on the east side of the Logan-Bear Lake Highway. 
He was driving a pick-up truck and pulling a two-wheeled 
cattle trailer behind. He was unable to load his horse on 
the trailer until he reached the main Logan-Bear Lake 
Highway where the accident occurred at 6:30 p. m., and 
the sun sets at said place at .5:32p.m. (Tr. 27). 
As Defendant came on the Logan Canyon Highway 
where Temple Fork Road intersects the said highway he 
crossed over to the west side and went down said highway 
sixty-five feet at which point he stopped and proceeded 
to load his horse on to the trailer. ( Tr. 102). 
There was no dispute in the testimony as to the sixty-
five feet. (Tr. 138). The Logan-Bear Lake Highway 
at this point runs in a northeasterly and southwesterly 
direction about seventeen miles from Logan. The oiled 
portion of the highway at this point is twenty feet wide 
with a two-foot shoulder on the west and a six or seven 
foot shoulder on the east, niaking a twenty-eight foot 
road. (Tr. 52, and 57). The east wheels of Defendant's 
outfit were about three and a half feet on the tarred sur-
face of the road and the west wheels were on the shoulder. 
Plaintiff was coming down the Canyon road in his 
truck, using dimmer lights and traveling from 30 to 35 
miles per hour. He testified that he could see only forty 
to fifty feet in front of him, and ran into the Defendant's 
truck and trailer. (Tr. 3-41-43-63). Plaintiff testified that 
he had been in the trucking business for many years and 
was familiar with this particular Canyon road. Plaintiff's 
testimony was that traveling 30 miles per hour he could 
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not stop his truck in less than seventy-nine feet ( Tr. 148) 
and his visibility in using dimmer lights was limited to 
forty to fifty feet in front of him. Plaintiff also testified 
that there was plenty of room on the road for him to have 
gone around the east side of Defendant's outfit, had he 
seen the trailer and truck in time. ( Tr. 52). Plaintiff 
testified that there was a straightaway about 400 to 500 
feet at this point and the road is plainly visible for that 
distance, also if flares were placed on the road, they would 
be visible up and down the road for said distance. ( Tr. 
20). If flares could be seen for that distance on the road 
why weren't the truck and trailer also visible to the plain-
tiff for the same distance. Plaintiff testified that he did 
not sound his horn at any time. (Tr. 44). 
Eugene Waite, the son of the Defendant, who was 
helping load the horse, testified that the truck and trailer 
were parked sixty-five feet down from the Temple Fork 
intersection. ( Tr. 82). The trailer and truck are five 
and a half feet wide and about three and a half feet of this 
width was the oiled road. ( Tr. 83). There were cars coming 
down the road prior to the Plaintiff's truck and Eugene 
Waite was flagging with his flashlight to warn the passing 
cars. (Tr. 84, 85 and 97). Anyone could see up the road 
from where the truck and trailer were parked a distance 
of 450 feet, (Tr. 86) and the road was straight for a 
distance of 200 feet. (Tr. 135). The road was plainly 
visible for a distance of 250 feet down from the scene of 
the accident. 
The defendant testified that he pulled down the main 
highway sixty-five fpet from the Temple Fork intersection 
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and parked on the west side of the road (Tr. 102 and 108) 
with his tail light burning on the left side of the truck. 
( Tr. 107 ) . When the collision occurred the Plaintiff's 
truck pushed the Defendant's outfit down the road a 
distance of seventy feet, (Tr. 110) causing damage to the 
trailer in the sum of $200.00 and to the truck the sum of 
$7 4.00. The Defendant testified that due to the muddy 
condition of the Temple Fork road, it was impossible for 
him to load the horse on to the trailer until they reached 
the Logan-Bear Lake Highway. (Tr. 113). 
Deputy Sheriff Thomas J. Rowley} at the time of the 
trial, went into the canyon and measured the distance from 
the Temple Fork intersection down to a point sixty-five 
feet (Tr. 154) and testified that at this point he could see 
up the road a distance of 200 feet. Thomas Rowley fur-
ther testified that you could see a cow, deer or a trailer 
200 feet up the road from where the accident occurred. 
( Tr. 155, 156 and 157). 
Harry L. Ashcroft also testified that he helped to 
measure a distance of 500 feet up the road from the site 
of the accident and that a truck was visible for that dis-
tance. There was a straightaway at this point in the road 
of 200 feet from the site of the accident. ( Tr. 139 and 
140). 
Plaintiff rested. Defendant made a motion for dir-
ected verdict against the Plaintiff on the grounds that he 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, on 
the grounds that Plaintiff was not driving within the range 
of his lights; that he failed to keep a proper look-out; that 
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he did not sound his horn; that he did not have his truck 
under control for the existing conditions; that he was 
traveling on dimmers with a visibility of forty to fifty feet 
and that he could not stop his truck in less than a distance 
of seventy-nine feet. The Court denied Defendant's 
motion. Defendant renewed his motion at the end of the 
trial and requested Instruction Number 5 against the 
Paintiff, but the Court refused to grant said Instruction. 
Defendant took exception to this refusal. Again Defendant 
made motion for Judgment nothwithstanding the verdict 
or in the alternative, motion for new trial, claiming that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law, which said motion was again denied by the Court. 
Defendant maintains that each one of the aforesaid 
motions should have been granted and that it was an error 
for the Court to deny the said motions and that the jury's 
verdict was not supported by the evidence. 
It is Defendant's contention from the above evidence 
that Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law and the Court committed error in refusing 
to grant any and all of the aforesaid motions. 
POINT NO.1 
The Court erred in denying Defendant's motions for 
directed verdict. 
POINT NO.2 
The Court erred in denying Defendant's motion for 
Judgment nothwithstanding the verdict, or in the alterna-
tive motion for a new trial. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
POINT NO.3 
The Court committed error in refusing to grant De-
fendant's requested Instruction Number .5. 
ARGUMENT OF POINTS ONE, TWO, AND THREE 
The argument of Points No.1, No.2, and No.3 will be 
made together inasmuch as the evidence and the law 
governing points are about the same. 
The evidence produced by the Plaintiff clearly estab-
lished as a matter of law that Plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence was the approximate cause of the accident. The 
trial Court committed error in denying all motions. The all 
controlling case in this matter is Nikoleropoulos vs. 
Ramsey, 214 Pacific 304, in which it held that it was negli-
gence for a person to drive an automobile on a public 
street at such a rate of speed that it cannot be stopped 
within the distance at which the operator is able to see 
objects on the street in front of him. The same rule of 
law was followed in the Dalley vs. Midwestern Dairy 
Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 Pacific 2nd 309, and in 
'Vright, vs. Maynard 235 Pacific 2nd 916. 
Plaintiff testified that he was coming down the Logan-
Bear Lake Highway in his truck, more than thirty minutes 
after sundown, using his dimmer lights and was traveling 
from 30 to 35 miles per hour. He could only see forty to 
fifty feet in front of his truck. (Tr. 3-41-43 and 63). 
Plaintiff's testimony was that when traveling thirty miles 
per hour he could not stop his truck in less than seventy-
nine feet (Tr. 148) and at 35 miles per he could not stop 
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in less· distance than ninety feet. He also testified that 
there was plenty of room on the road for him to have gone 
around c,n the east side of Defendant's outfit if he had seen 
the trailer and tnlCk in time. It therefore follows that the 
reason this accident was not avoided was on account of the 
fact that the Plaintiff did not have proper vision and could 
not see far enough ahead at the rate of speed he was travel-
ing in order to have avoided the accident. 
Session Laws of Utah, 1949, 57-7-196 which is as fol-
lows and was in effect at the time of this accident: (d) 
"The lowermost beams shall be so aimed and of sufficient 
intensity to reveal a person or vehicle at a distance of at 
least 100 feet ahead." The statute also requires that the up-
per lights of the motor vehicles should be such as to reveal 
persons and vehicles at a distance of 350 feet ahead. There 
is no dispute as to the aforesaid evidence as it was pro-
duced by the Plaintiff. From the testimony of the Plaintiff 
the lights of his automobile did not meet the requirements 
of the said statute and he could only see from forty to fifty 
feet ahead of him. There are many cases that hold that 
violation of a traffic law constitutes negligence as a matter 
of law. It was held in Shimizer vs. Kurtz, 11 Pacific 2nd 
1 that failure to have lights on an automobile conforming 
to the requirements of the motor vehicle code was of itself 
negligence. This same rule is also followed in Pollard vs. 
Whitman 183 Pacific 2nd 175; 28 Washington 2nd 367. 
According to the testimony of Sheriff Thomas J. 
Rowley, Eugene Waite, Harry L. Ashcroft and the defend-
ant, a vehicle, at the place of the accident could be plainly 
seen for a distance of at least 200 feet up the road and at 
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least 200 feet down the road. If the plaintiff had been 
using the proper lights and keeping a proper lookout and 
had not been negligent, no accident would have occured. 
Plaintiff testified that he did not sound his horn at 
any time, (Tr. 44), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, .57-7-171 
reads as follows: 
DRIVING IN CANYONS AND ON MOUNTAIN 
HIGHWAYS. The driver of a motor vehicle traveling 
through defiles or canyons or on mountain highways 
shall hold such motor vehicle under control and as 
near the right-hand edge of the highway as reasonably 
possible and, upon approaching any curve where the 
view is obstructed within a distance of 200 feet along 
the highway, shall give audible warning with the horn 
of such motor vehicle. 
It is the contention of the defendant that the evidence 
in this case does not sustain the verdict of the jury and in 
view of the evidence, the defendant should have recovered 
on his cross-complaint. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Defendant respectfully submits that the court should 
reverse the decision and find the plaintiff guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law and enter judgment 
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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